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Abstract. Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, 
then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the 
logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such 
dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical 
constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of 
understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be 
adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an alternative account 
according to which understanding a logical constant is not to be understood 
dispositionally, but propositionally. I argue that this account is not inconsistent with 
intuitively correct manifestations of understanding the logical constants. 
 
 
1. Understanding the logical constants 
 
One great question in the epistemology of language is how to explain speakers’ 
understanding of the lexical items of their language: what their competence with an 
expression consists in. 
 
Something which understanding or competence with an expression should help to explain is 
speakers’ use of – or competence with – that expression.
1
 For instance, an account of your 
understanding the word ‘cow’ should contribute to explaining your correct uses of that. I 
shall not explore here how that explanatory connection might be accounted for. But 
however it is accounted for, it seems that the following minimal constraint should be met by 
any account of competence with an expression: 
 
(CT) An account of speakers’ understanding of an expression should be 
consistent with their correct performances with that expression. 
 
This is a weak constraint, since the connection between competence and performance much 
tighter. But this will suffice for the purposes of this paper. This constraint is also vague: 
consistency could receive many interpretations, and more should be said about what counts 
as a correct performance with an expression. The particular interpretation of (CT) that will 
be relevant here will be made more precise below. 
 
This paper is concerned with the specific question of what it is to understand a logical 
constant. A logical constant is an expression that plays an important role in logic, and in 
particular in the theory of logically valid inference, i.e. of inference that is valid because of 
                                                           
1
 I of course borrow the distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic performance from Chomsky 
(1965) 
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its logical form. There is no consensus on how to define a logical constant, and I shall not 
attempt a definition here. But there is some sort of consensus on the sorts of expressions that 
are at issue, e.g. expressions such as ‘and’, ’if, then’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘all’, and ‘some’.
2
 
 
The question of what understanding a logical constant consists in has received a lot of 
attention recently, and prominent new accounts have generated substantive debates. Why 
does this question deserve special attention? The case of the logical constants has been at 
the forefront of a certain picture of understanding the expressions of a language, which is 
that of conceptual role semantics (CRS). On such a semantics a speaker’s understanding of 
an expression is constituted by that expression’s conceptual role – i.e. by its role in the 
speaker’s ‘cognitive economy’; in particular, the inferential relations in which the 
expressions plays a part.
3
 
 
The logical constants play a key role in logically valid inference. And so a natural thought, 
which is key to the prominent accounts, is that that their meanings might be defined by 
whatever rules govern some of these inferences. Thus, on many accounts, the meanings of 
the logical constants are determined by basic inferential rules; more precisely by the 
introduction and elimination rules of those constants. These rules can be thought of as 
implicit definitions of the meanings of the logical constants or as kinds of meaning 
postulates. For instance, on this sort of account, the meaning of ‘if, then’ is fixed by its 
introduction and elimination rules, namely Conditional Proof (CP) and Modus Ponens 
(MP):
4
 
 
(CP) An inference of Q from the assumption P entails if P, then Q. 
(MP) P and if P, then Q together entail Q. 
 
Given this picture of meaning, it is natural to think that understanding a logical constant is a 
matter of being competent with the inferential rules that fix its meaning. Thus, for instance, 
understanding ‘if, then’ consists in being competent with MP and CP. 
 
This paper attacks the particular implementation this picture of understanding an expression 
given by the prominent account, and not CRS in general: on this account, competence with a 
logical rule is to be explained in terms of dispositions. I will argue that a dispositionalist 
account of competence with logical rules as an account of understanding the logical 
constants cannot meet constraint (CT). For this reason, such an account should be rejected.  
 
In section 2, I outline the dispositionalist account. In sections 3-5 I argue against two 
versions of this account. Finally, in section 6, I outline and defend an alternative in terms of 
a propositional account. 
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 See for instance Mac Farlane (2009) for a review of the different ways in which the logical constants could 
be characterised. 
3
 See for instance Block (2000), and Fodor (2008), pp. 34 ff. for a critical assessment of. CRS. CRS is really 
first a theory about concepts, which are defined by their roles in one’s cognitive economy. Then the meanings 
of linguistic expressions are in turn defined by these concepts. (See Harman (1982)). Here, I focus on 
expressions, but the argument of the paper of course easily translates to concepts. 
4
 See Harman (1986), Appendix 1 for a discussion CRS for the logical constants. In what follows I shall make 
two assumptions that are generally made in such accounts of the meanings of the logical constants: their 
semantics can be given truth-functionally and the relevant proof system that adequately expresses these 
introduction and elimination rules is some kind of system of natural deduction. 
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2. The Dispositionalist Account 
 
The idea of accounting for understanding a logical constant in terms of being competent 
with its introduction and elimination rules of course invites the question of what being 
competent with such rules amounts to. A popular answer to this question is that this 
competence should be explained in terms of dispositions. Thus, for instance, being 
competent with MP is having a disposition to infer according to it, i.e. a disposition to infer 
Q from P and if P, then Q.
5
 
 
If this account of being competent with a logical rule is combined with the CRS account of 
understanding a logical constant, the result is that understanding a logical constant is having 
dispositions to infer according to its introduction and elimination rules. Thus understanding 
‘if, then’ is having both a disposition to infer according to MP and a disposition to infer 
according to CP. 
 
Consider Boghossian’s dispositionalist account, which is the best developed dispositionalist 
account of understanding a logical constant. According to him, someone’s dispositions to 
infer according to certain logical rules fix what they mean by the logical constants that 
figure in them. When someone has this sort of meaning-constituting disposition, they are 
‘entitled’ or have ‘the right’ to the disposition.
6
 This disposition can be had independently of 
having any (explicit) belief about the relevant rule, e.g. that it is truth-preserving. But to at 
all have that belief, and be justified in having it, one ought to have the concept as fixed by 
the disposition. As Boghossian puts it:  
 
… without those dispositions there is nothing about whose justification we can 
intelligibly raise a question about: without those dispositions we could not even 
have the general belief whose justification is supposed to be in question.
7
 
 
So the view is that to at all count as understanding ‘if, then’ someone must have the 
meaning-constituting disposition to infer according to MP, where this is a mere disposition 
(not essentially connected to any propositional attitude). This disposition in turn grounds any 
sort of justification which they might have for their explicit beliefs about MP. But of course 
they may never reach the stage of forming such beliefs. 
 
This picture is very attractive. Some even argue that it is required.
8
 I will not here review all 
the reasons in favour of a dispositional account. I only mention a couple here, which relate 
to constraint (CT).  
 
The dispositional account is attractive because it makes a tight connection between 
competence and performance: being competent with a logical constant is having a 
disposition to use that expression in a certain way. Thus it might be thought that the account 
is likely to make the required explanatory connection between competence and correct 
                                                           
5
 See for instance Ryle (1946) and (1949), Priest (1979), Harman (1986), Boghossian (1996), (2000) and 
(2001), Rumfitt (2001) and Devitt (2006) for endorsements of this view. 
6
 Boghossian, (2000), p. 230. Here I do not go into the details of what exactly makes a logical rule meaning-
constituting according to him. See Boghossian (1996). 
7
 Boghossian, (2000), p. 250. 
8
 Many think that it is required because of Carroll’s regress argument in (1895). See for instance Ryle (1949) 
and Boghossian (2005, p. 250). But see my (2010) for arguments that Carroll’s regress gives no support to a 
dispositional account of being competent with a logical rule. 
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performance.
9
 It is also attractive because many people (e.g. young children) who seem to 
count as understanding a logical constant, because, for instance they reliably infer according 
to its introduction and elimination rules, cannot articulate these rules – e.g. cannot articulate 
MP and CP. Mere dispositions seem to be a good candidate to explain the sort of 
competence that can be attributed to such people.
10
 
 
The simplest way of stating the dispositional account of understanding a logical constant 
explains understanding in terms of dispositions to infer (DI): 
 
(UDI): Understanding a logical constant is having a dispositions to infer 
according to its introduction and its elimination rules. 
 
The sample logical constant which I will focus on in the remainder of the paper is ‘if, then’, 
and thus, the following special case of (UDI‘if, then’): 
 
(UDI‘if, then’): Understanding ‘if, then’ is having a dispositions to infer according 
to CP and MP. 
 
For convenience, I am going to leave CP behind and focus only on the disposition to infer 
according to MP, which constitutes part of understanding ‘if, then’: 
 
(UDI‘if, then’-MP): Understanding ‘if, then’ requires having a disposition to infer 
according to MP, i.e. a disposition to infer Q from P and if P, then Q. 
 
(UDI‘if, then’-MP) seems to be the most natural account of how competence with MP might 
come into an account of understanding ‘if, then’. However Boghossian thinks that a 
disposition with respect to MP should be stated in a different way – not as a disposition to 
infer according to MP, but as a disposition to reason according to it. As he puts it: 
 
Suppose that it is a fact about S that whenever he believes that p, and believes that ‘if 
p, then q’, he is disposed either to believe q or to reject one of the other propositions. 
Whenever this is so… I shall say that S is disposed to reason according to the rule 
modus ponens.
11
 
 
Thus the disposition required to understand ‘if, then’, is rather the following disposition to 
reason (DR) according to MP: 
 
                                                           
9 Many philosophers, after Ryle (1949), think that competence with a logical rule is a kind of knowing how 
which is to be understood dispositionally. One feature of an account in terms of knowing how is that it is 
supposed to be better than one in terms of knowing that at explaining the (tight) connection between 
competence and action. 
10 Thus Boghossian has argued recently (see his 2003) that logical reasoning can be, as he puts it, ‘blameless 
but blind’. On the one hand, such reasoning can be the manifestation of competence with a logical rule, but 
this competence is not explicitly articulated. According to him, dispositions are well suited to account for 
blameless but blind reasoning, given that they do not require you to have the relevant concepts needed to 
articulate the rule. 
11
 Boghossian (2000), p. 230; see also (2001), p. 633 n. 10. The way Boghossian states it, a disposition to 
reason according to MP only has beliefs as inputs and outputs. But of course, one can have a disposition to 
infer according to MP with propositional attitudes different from belief (e.g. suppositions), and perhaps less 
than fully formed propositional attitudes (e.g. suppositions). I do not pursue this issue here. 
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(UDR‘if, then’-MP): Understanding ‘if, then’ requires having a disposition to reason 
according to MP, i.e. a disposition to infer Q, or reject P, or reject if P, then Q, 
from P and if P, then Q. 
 
(UDI‘if, then’-MP) and (UDR‘if, then’-MP) attribute different competence to someone who 
understands ‘if, then’. And thus it counts different sorts of performances as direct 
manifestation of understanding ‘if, then. For instance, the latter counts rejecting P as a 
manifestation of your understanding of ‘if, then’ but the former does not. So both accounts 
cannot be right. I shall discuss (URI‘if, then’-MP) in detail in section 4. I will first discuss, in the 
next section, the account in (UDI‘if, then’-MP). Showing why this simple account fails will 
make it easier to see why the more complex account in (URI‘if, then’-MP) also fails. 
 
 
3. (UDI‘if, then’-MP) and Correct Performance 
 
In section 1, constraint (CT) was put forward as a constraint on an account of understanding 
an expression: it should be consistent with the ways in which we correctly exercise that 
understanding in linguistic performance.  
 
Let’s consider a special case of (CT), concerning ‘if, then’ specifically: 
 
(CT‘if, then’) An account of speakers’ understanding of ‘if, then’ should be 
consistent with their correct performances with it. 
 
I will now argue that (UDI‘if, then’-MP) is inconsistent with (CT‘if, then’), and so can’t be the 
right account of understanding ‘if, then’. To see this, consider the following example: 
 
(Ice-Cream) You form the project to buy an ice-cream and come to believe that 
you will buy an ice-cream. But you look at your watch and realise that if you buy 
an ice-cream, you are going to miss your train. You really don’t want to do that. 
So you don’t infer that you’ll miss your train, and give up your project of buying 
an ice-cream instead. 
 
Such kinds of examples have been made famous by Gilbert Harman who uses them to argue 
that ordinary reasoning – or reasoned change in view – has little to do with deductive 
logic.
12
 The way I take the example of reasoned change in view in (Ice-Cream) is this: you 
are competent with MP; indeed intuitively you exercise or manifest your competence with 
MP when you see what your initial beliefs (that you will get an ice-cream and that if you get 
an ice-cream you will miss your train) commit you to doing. But you do not infer according 
to MP (infer that you will miss your train). You give up one of your initial views instead. So 
although your competence with MP is manifested, it is not manifested by inferring 
according to MP. 
 
Cases such as (Ice-Cream) are possible, indeed common: many pieces of ordinary reasoning 
cannot, or cannot wholly, be explained in terms of competence with deductive reasoning. 
Someone might reason in a perfectly acceptable way, without following a logical principle, 
although their competence with the principle might be in play.
13
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 See Harman (1986), esp. chs 1&2. 
13 This is not meant as a definition of reasoned change in view, just an initial characterisation to fix ideas. 
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Before considering (Ice-Cream) and (UDI‘if, then’-MP) together, a clarification is in order about 
how I understand the idea of following a logical rule in reasoning. I take it that someone 
follows MP when they go from P, and if P, then Q, to Q, and I take it that the content of MP 
is roughly that P, and if P, then Q, together entail Q. Notice that this is equivalent to: P, and 
if P, then Q, and not-Q, together entail a contradiction. However, I take it that the latter does 
not state the content of MP, and so someone is not following MP when they reason in this 
way; for it is not about the consequent following the conditional and its antecedent, which is 
what I take the content of MP is about. If it were a statement of MP, that is, if all of the 
principles equivalent to MP were taken to be MP, giving an account of knowing MP would 
be implausibly difficult. I shall come back to this issue in section 4, when I consider (UDR‘if, 
then’-MP). 
 
Consider now (UDI‘if, then’-MP) together with (Ice-Cream). In (Ice-Cream), you start off with 
P, the project of buying an ice-cream and if P, then Q, the thought that if you buy an ice-
cream, you will miss your train. At this point, the condition of manifestation of the 
disposition stated in (UDI‘if, then’-MP) obtains. So you should manifest the disposition – i.e. 
infer Q, that you will miss your train. But you do not do that and give up buying the ice 
cream instead. 
 
The problem is that, given (UDI‘if, then’-MP), a case where you have the relevant initial beliefs 
but fail to infer (the condition of manifestation obtains but there is no manifestation) is a 
case in which it has a falsifying exception; for dispositions cannot fail to manifest when their 
conditions of manifestation obtain. That is the point of dispositions.
14
 
 
What should we say? The problematic consequence of this is that it appears that you have 
lost the disposition stated in (UDI‘if, then’-MP): it was destroyed when you formed the belief 
not-Q. And since having the disposition is required for understanding ‘if, then’, your 
understanding too has been destroyed. 
 
That any such thing has been destroyed when you came to believe not-Q is of course absurd. 
But it also entails that constraint (CT‘if, then’) is not satisfied if (UDI‘if, then’-MP) is part of an 
account of understanding ‘if, then’: in (Ice-Cream) you manifest your understanding of ‘if, 
then’ when you see what your initial views commit you to do (i.e. infer that you will miss 
your train). But according to (UDI‘if, then’-MP) you do not manifest your understanding of ‘if, 
then’ at all because you do not infer according to MP. Thus this account of understanding 
‘if, then’ is not consistent with this kind of manifestation of your understanding of ‘if, then’. 
It counts your understanding as being destroyed in the process. More precisely: performance 
with ‘if, then’ of the sort displayed in (Ice-Cream) is inconsistent with what an account of 
understanding in terms of (UDI‘if, then’-MP) says manifesting understanding of ‘if, then’ ought 
to be like. One way to put it is by saying that this account makes the wrong prediction of 
what performance with ‘if, then’ might count as adequate – it counts correct uses as 
incorrect. 
 
Also it might be that typically people revise their views rather than infer according to logical 
rules. There would be nothing wrong with this. So (Ice-Cream) cannot be dismissed as an 
atypical case, which would not obviously violate constraint (CT‘if, then’). 
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 I shall not consider specific accounts of dispositions. However it is implicit in the discussion here that 
dispositions connect in some way with some sort of would-conditional. If you are disposed to infer according 
to MP, (other things being equal) if you believed both P and if P, then Q, you would infer/come to believe Q. 
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A proponent of (UDI‘if, then’-MP) will no doubt have a lot to say about how to avoid these 
consequences. And she is likely to want to move to a more complex account or less 
stringent of dispositions in order to avoid them. Indeed what would seem to be required here 
is something written into the statement of the disposition which entails that the disposition is 
not destroyed when the condition of manifestation (intuitively) obtains but there is no 
manifestation – there ought to be permissible exceptions to the disposition. The way 
Harman, who endorses a dispositionalist account, puts it is by saying that the disposition 
should be such that it ‘may be overridden by other considerations’.
15
 I shall not review here 
the possible things dispositionalists might say to achieve this.
16
 However, I now briefly 
address one thing which the she might want to say here as an immediate reaction to the 
problem. 
 
A dispositionalist might just go stubborn here, and argue that you really do infer Q (that you 
will miss your train) in (Ice-Cream): you first infer Q, from your initial beliefs P, and if P, 
then Q; then you also come to believe not-Q, see that something has to go, and eventually 
reject P. She could even make the stronger claim that you have to infer Q in order to revise 
one of your initial beliefs: in order to give up buying an ice-cream because you do not want 
to miss your train, you have to believe that you will miss your train. That is, you have to 
reach an outright contradiction; for only then can you really see the conflict between this 
and believing that you will not miss your train.  
 
However, going stubborn is not going to help the dispoitionalist. I outline five problems 
with this move. 
 
1. Firstly, there does not seem much by way of a motivation for insisting that you infer Q in 
(Ice-Cream), except that it is required by (UDI‘if, then’-MP). We would at least need some 
independent reason as to why we always have to reach explicit contradictions – something 
like an irrational commitment – in order to revise our views. 
 
2. Secondly, going stubborn just seems to amount to denying the phenomenon of reasoned 
change in view: it amounts to denying that instead of inferring according to MP, you could 
revise your beliefs. But again, reasoned change in view seems possible. 
 
3. Thirdly, it does not seem right to say that if you believe a conditional and its antecedent, 
any action on these beliefs will involve believing the consequent. It seems possible to 
appreciate or see the commitment of your beliefs without embracing them: considering your 
beliefs’ commitments does not amount to believing those commitments. 
 
4. Fourthly, if really you always infer Q once you believe that P and that if P, then Q, that 
means that sometimes you will form the belief that Q for an extremely short time – perhaps 
a nanosecond. But that might not be enough time to form a belief or a proper propositional 
attitude: it is unclear that propositional attitudes such as a belief could kick in for a 
nanosecond (say). So the outputs of the disposition stated in (UDI‘if, then’-MP) for instance 
might not be fully-formed propositional attitudes. Thus, dispositionalists at least owe us a 
story about what these outputs would be and how they would relate to such attitudes. 
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 See Harman (1986: p. 19). 
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 See my (forthcoming) for a discussion of possible dispositionalist moves to address the problem of 
falsifying exceptions (e.g. in terms of masks or habitual or weaker accounts). In that paper, I argue that none of 
these moves can handle the problems posed by (Ice-Cream). Here, I only discuss Boghossian’s attempt. 
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5. Fifthly, a big problem with going stubborn is that sometimes you might do nothing 
whatsoever once you believe P and if P, then Q: you might leave the matter there, get 
distracted or interrupted, or do something completely unrelated. The stubborn 
dispositionalist would also have to say that you do infer in such cases – otherwise we’d have 
a falsifying exception to the disposition with the destructions that this entails. However, it 
seems wrong to say that somehow you come to believe Q, and only after, perhaps, revise 
that belief to form no further belief.  
 
So the dispositionalist cannot just be stubborn. She has to come up with a statement of the 
relevant disposition that is not falsified by the fact that you might manifest your 
understanding of ‘if, then’ but not by inferring according to MP, i.e. by inferring P once P, 
and if P, then Q are in place. 
 
As I said, Boghossian’s (UDR‘if, then’-MP) is meant to address these problems faced by (UDI‘if, 
then’-MP) – its inconsistency with reasoned change in view. So let’s see whether he succeeds. 
 
 
4. (UDR‘if, then’-MP) 
 
As we have seen in section 1, Boghossian gives the following is a partial account of 
understanding ‘if, then’: 
 
(UDR‘if, then’-MP): Understanding ‘if, then’ requires having a disposition to reason 
according to MP, i.e. a disposition to infer Q, or reject P, or reject if P, then Q, from P 
and if P, then Q. 
 
(UDR‘if, then’-MP) is a so-called ‘multi-track’ disposition, which allows several type of 
manifestations of the disposition, as opposed to a ‘single-track’ one, such as (UDI‘if, then’-MP), 
which only allows for one type of manifestation.
17
 Interestingly, it allows for the rejection if 
P as a manifestation of the disposition, which seems to be exactly what we should be 
looking for in the case of (Ice-Cream). 
 
Now, as stated, (UDR‘if, then’-MP) will not do; and this for two reasons: 
 
Firstly, inferring Q, or rejecting either P or if P, then Q, are not the only things you might do 
once you’re committed to both P and if P, then Q. As said in section 2.5, you might also do 
nothing whatsoever: neither infer nor reject. Thus to capture the different things you might 
do once you believe both P and if P, then Q, doing nothing ought to be included as a 
possible manifestation of the disposition. 
 
Secondly, there isn’t one general reason why you might not infer Q given that you believe 
both P and if P, then Q. There are many different ones: P and if P, then Q, are not as such 
going to equally bring about inferring Q or rejecting P or rejecting if P, then Q or doing 
nothing. In particular, P, and if P, then Q is not just like that going to bring about rejecting 
P. To reject P as a manifestation of your disposition, types of stimuli different from P and if 
P, then Q have to be factored in. If anything, it is rejecting Q and believing if P, then Q that 
can bring about rejecting P. That is, if the disposition is really going to be multi-track, it 
should be by factoring different types of stimuli which explain the different types of 
manifestation. 
                                                           
17 See Bird (2007) for a good discussion of multi-track dispositions. 
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I will set aside the first point, and look at how to modify (UDR‘if, then’-MP) so that it takes care 
of the second one. So there is no attempt to completeness here. Boghossian’s (UDR‘if, then’-
MP) should really look like (UDR‘if, then’-MP)*, which states a disposition with different types 
of manifestation for different types of stimuli: 
 
(UDR‘if, then’-MP)*: Understanding ‘if, then’ requires having a disposition to reason 
according to MP, i.e. 
 
(DI1) Being disposed to infer Q from P and if P, then Q. 
(DI2) Being disposed to reject P from if P, then Q and not-Q. 
(DI3) Being disposed to reject if P, then Q from P and not-Q. 
………. 
 
I look at this account together with (Ice-Cream) in the next section. Before doing so, it is 
worth considering whether (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* can really be a serious contender as a partial 
account of understanding ‘if, then’. I mention two difficulties. 
 
(i) Firstly, it is unclear in what sense (UDR‘if, then’MP)* gives a characterisation of 
competence with MP. The standard way of stating MP says nothing about rejection. 
Intuitively, rejecting propositions goes beyond the exercise of that competence, and it goes 
beyond manifestation of understanding ‘if, then’. Activities of rejection may be closely 
related to one’s competence with MP, and might even require such competence. Still it does 
not seem that it is part of what it is to understand ‘if, then’. 
 
That rejection should be part of one’s understanding of ‘if, then’ is especially implausible 
given the claim that the meanings of the logical constants is determined by their 
introduction and elimination rules (see again section 1.). For these rules say nothing about 
rejection. In particular MP and CP say nothing about rejection.  
 
Other sorts of accounts of understanding of ‘if, then’ would be better at accommodating the 
idea that rejection is part of understanding it. Consider for instance an account of the 
meanings of the logical constants, not in terms of introduction and elimination rules, but in 
terms of truth-tables. Consider the truth-table for ‘if, then’. It not only tells you what 
happens with Q, when you have P and if P, then Q being true, but it also tells you what 
happens with respect to Q with every other combination of truth-values for P and if P, then 
Q. When you look at this truth-table at a line where Q is false, you see that either P is true 
and if P, then Q is false, or that P is false and if P, then Q is true. That is to say, you see that 
there is a way to Q being false, i.e. not-Q. So maybe on a truth-table account of the 
meanings of the logical constants, you could argue that something like rejection is part of 
your understanding of ‘if, then’. 
 
However, this truth-table account is not what dispositionalists about understanding ‘if, then’ 
have argued for. Also, this account will look problematic to many, and certainly to 
dispositionalists and conceptual role semanticists. This is because a truth-table account 
makes no connection between understanding ‘if, then’ and deductive reasoning, in 
particular, it makes no connection between understanding ‘if, then’ and inferring according 
to MP. And this is a connection which dispositionalists aim to capture. 
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(ii) Given (UDR‘if, then’-MP), understanding ‘if, then’ requires having a fairly sophisticated 
disposition, which involves not just inferring but also rejecting. The worry here is that it is 
perhaps too sophisticated and thus too demanding to be required for understanding MP.
18
 
 
To see this, consider for instance (DI2). (DI2) looks very much like a disposition to infer 
according to Modus Tollens (MT); MT can be stated as follows: 
 
(MT) From not Q, and if P, then Q, not-P follows. 
 
That is (DI2) might really be stated as follows: 
 
(DI2)*: Being disposed to infer not P from if P, then Q and not-Q.
19
 
 
In this case, having a disposition to reason according to MP requires having a disposition to 
infer according to MT. Thus understanding ‘if, then’ requires understanding ‘not’, where 
understanding ‘not’ requires being disposed to infer according to the introduction and 
elimination rules for ‘not’.  
 
If understanding ‘not’ is part of understanding ‘if, then’, the worry is indeed that the account 
is too demanding. It may be that in the neighbourhood of understanding ‘if, then’ there is 
understanding ‘not’ or that there is a very tight connection between understanding ‘if, then’ 
and understanding ‘not’. Maybe you even want to say that you could not understand ‘if, 
then’ if you didn’t understand ‘not’. But that doesn’t mean that it’s got to be part of 
understanding ‘if, then’. By analogy, consider understanding ‘red’. Perhaps we want to say 
that we should grant understanding ‘red’ only to people who are fairly good at applying 
‘red’ to red things, and, perhaps as a consequence, not applying ‘red’ to things that are not 
red. That’s fine, but that doesn’t entail that understanding ‘not red’ is part of understanding 
‘red’. 
 
Also, from a logical standpoint, MP is more basic than MT; MT is typically a derived rule 
(derived using MP). It would be a bit quick to infer from this that there is a conceptual 
priority of MP over MT. Still, it seems more likely that, if there is any kind of priority, it 
goes from understanding MP to understanding MT. 
 
One might attempt to address this objection by denying that the move from (DI2) to (DI2)*, 
which presupposes that rejecting P is the same as coming to believe not-P. I.e. it 
presupposes the following parity principle: 
 
(Parity) Rejecting a proposition isdf. coming to believe its negation.
20
  
 
However, if rejecting a proposition is not defined in terms of believing its negation, the 
following view is open to the dispositionalist: having a disposition to reason according to 
                                                           
18 This objection would also apply to the truth-table account mentioned above. 
19
 Here, I ignore complexities that arise from the fact that if MP is going to be multi-track, then presumably 
MT is going to be multi-track too. If part of being competent with MP is being competent with MT, that means 
that the disposition will really be more complex than that stated in (UDR‘if, then’-MP). For instance, for (DI2)*, 
there will be tree sub-dispositions, depending on whether one infers the conclusion or rejects one of the 
premises. 
20
 There is no need here to insist on a precise formulation of (Parity). It could be stated in terms of assertion or 
judgement rather than in terms of belief; it could be stated not as a definition between mental states/events, but 
as a weaker condition. 
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MP requires having dispositions to reject as well as to infer, where the former is not 
conceptually more demanding than the latter. Thus in particular a disposition to infer 
according to MT is not part of understanding ‘if, then’. 
 
Ian Rumfitt thinks that the meanings of the logical constants are given by their introduction 
and elimination rules; but he rejects (Parity).
21
 So it is worth briefly considering his view. 
He thinks that there are two primitive speech acts, acceptance and rejection, where rejection 
is not defined in terms of acceptance and negation: rejecting a proposition need not be 
accepting its negation. Someone might reject a proposition and thereby not want to accept 
that it is false: for instance they might want to reject the proposition that they have not 
stopped beating their wife without wanting to assert that they have stopped beating their 
wife – because of its presupposition.  
 
Rumfitt offers an account of the meanings of the logical constants in terms of basic logical 
rules which involve both acceptance and rejection as primitive speech acts (represented by 
different primitive symbols in the object language). In particular, some of the rules that 
characterise negation are stated using rejection (e.g. one of the rules for negation 
introduction says that from the rejection of a proposition acceptance of its negation can be 
inferred). 
 
One might worry that rejecting (at least) involves holding not true (even if not being true 
indeed falls short of being false), i.e. accepting as not true. However, according to Rumfitt, a 
rejection of a proposition, written ‘ – P’, should be understood as a question (i.e. ‘P?’) with 
a negative answer appended to it (‘P? No’). Questions are not the sorts of things that are true 
of false; they rather have correctness and incorrectness conditions. So rejections are really 
correct or incorrect rather than true or false.
22
 So there is not conceptual connection between 
rejection and falsity.  
 
Thus, given this framework, understanding ‘not’ is not part of understanding ‘if, then’, even 
if (DI2) is in place, and so a disposition to infer according to MT is not part of understanding 
‘if, then’.  
 
Going to this would be a bit quick however; for the way Rumfitt sets things up, there is no 
natural connection between rejection and MP. He characterises MP purely in terms of the 
speech act of acceptation: to paraphrase, if someone accepts both premises, they can accept 
the conclusion. In his system, some of the other rules of proof that characterise material 
implication involve the rejection sign, but not MP. There is also no suggestion that 
competence with them is required to be competent with MP. Being competent with these 
rules is, according to him, necessary to understand aspects of the meaning of ‘if, then’; but 
they do not connect with MP. So Rumfitt’s rules are not the sorts of rules that a defender of 
(UDR‘if, then’-MP)* is looking for: although they involve a primitive, undefined, act of 
rejection, they are strictly rules of deductive reasoning: rules that say how to go from a set 
of premises to a conclusion. They give no instruction about giving up premises in a given 
application of MP.  
 
                                                           
21
 See Rumfitt (2000). Rumfitt’s motivation in the paper is to offer an account of the basic rules of classical 
logic that satisfy specific formal requirements such as harmony and stability. These need not concern us here. 
22
 Thus for him the primary speech act is that of questions; and to understand the proposition that P, i.e. its 
truth-conditions, someone has to understand the question whether P, i.e. its correctness-conditions. 
  
12
There may be ways to use Rumfitt’s notion of rejection in an account of (UDR‘if, then’-MP)*. 
That would require developing a – probably fairly complicated – proof-system, where each 
rule is stated both in terms of acceptance and rejection. But at this point the onus is really on 
the dispositionalist to show us how that might be possible and whether it would really 
worthwhile. But as things stands it looks like (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* is really too demanding to be 
required to understand ‘if, then’. 
 
 
5. (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* and Performance 
 
I now consider (Ice-Cream) together with (UDR‘if, then’-MP)*, and argue that the latter does 
not meet constraint (CT‘if, then’).  
 
When (Ice-Cream) is considered, it is easy to see that an account of understanding ‘if, then’ 
in terms of (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* faces the exact same problem as that in terms of (UDI‘if, then’-MP) 
 
To see this, consider (DI1), which is one of the dispositions stated in (UDR‘if, then’-MP). (DI1) 
is of course required as one of the dispositions that counts towards understanding ‘if, then’; 
if anything it covers the paradigmatic way of manifesting understanding ‘if, then’ on a CRS 
account of the meaning of ’if, then’. However it creates the exact same problem as (UDI‘if, 
then’-MP) – indeed it states the same disposition – when (Ice-Cream) is considered. Thus, in 
(Ice-Cream), you start with P and if P, then Q. Given (UDR‘if, then’-MP)*, (DI1) is activated – 
you should infer Q. However, you do not do this. You come to believe not-Q and reject P 
instead.  
 
It thus appears that (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* has a falsifying exception in the exact same way as 
before. And so it appears that (DI1) would have been destroyed in the process – when you 
formed the belief not-Q. And that means that your disposition to reason according to MP 
has been destroyed, and given that on (UDR‘if, then’-MP)*, this disposition is necessary for 
counting as understanding ‘if, then’, you have ceased understanding ‘if, then’ too. It was 
destroyed when you came to believe not-Q. 
 
That any such thing has been destroyed when you came to believe not-Q is again absurd. 
And it entails that given (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* as part of an account of understanding ‘if, then’, 
constraint (CT‘if, then’) is not satisfied; for again, in (Ice-Cream) you manifest your 
understanding of ‘if, then’ when you see what your initial views commit you to do (i.e. infer 
that you will miss your train). On (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* however you do not manifest it, since 
you do not reason according to MP. Thus this account of understanding ‘if, then’ too is not 
consistent with this kind of manifestation of your understanding of ‘if, then’: your 
understanding is destroyed in the process. Again, performance with ‘if, then’ of the sort 
displayed in (Ice-Cream) is inconsistent with what an account of understanding in terms of 
(UDR‘if, then’MP)*. 
 
One way of thinking of (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* is as an attempt to make your competence with 
MP dynamic by covering the different things you might do once P and if P, then Q are in 
place. The only advantage of (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* over (UDI‘if, then’-MP) is that it can in some 
sense capture aspects of a reasoning similar to that involved in (Ice-Cream) in terms of your 
disposition to reason according to MP: you start with P, and if P, then Q. (DI1) gets 
activated. You infer Q. You then also form the belief not-Q. You reach a contradiction; you 
have to give up something. You want to give up Q. So that leaves you with believing P, if P, 
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then Q and not-Q. Something else has to go. You want to hold on to if P, then Q and not-Q. 
(DI2) gets activated and that enables you to reject P.
23
 
 
But this is not the reasoning in (Ice-Cream). This is not a case of reasoned change in view. 
And there is no taking away the fact that (DI1) is violated in (Ice-Cream). Thus (UDR‘if, then’-
MP)* is ill-suited to track your reasoning in that very piece of reasoning.  
 
So it seems that both (UDI‘if, then’-MP) and (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* make the wrong prediction of 
what performance with ‘if, then’ count as adequate. They both fail to meet constraint (CT‘if, 
then’). They give us the wrong picture of how understanding ‘if, then’ connects with 
competence with ‘if, then’.  
 
There would be many more accounts of dispositions consider before being in a position to 
reject dispositionalist accounts of understanding ‘if, then’ in general. But notice that any 
such account will have something like (DI1) in place – if, perhaps, in a weaker or more 
complicated form. It is thus really the core of the dispositionalist accounts that is 
problematic. As I said, I will not review all the possible moves dispositionalists could make 
at this point. And no doubt there are many. Rather, I will turn the question of whether a 
propositional account could handle (Ice-Cream) better and meet constraint (CT). 
 
 
6. The Propositional View 
 
In this section I outline briefly an alternative account of understanding the logical constants. 
I am not claiming that this is the only non-dispositional account that would be available, but 
this is one that does well in the context of reasoned change in view. I will not challenge here 
the assumption that understanding ‘if, then’ requires being competent with both its 
introduction rule CP and its elimination rule MP or the general picture of understanding 
given by CRS (even if I ultimately would be inclined to reject it). However I will challenge 
the idea that such competence should be accounted for dispositionally. Rather, I think it 
should be understood propositionally. 
 
The failure of the dispositional account suggests the following two conditions being 
competent with a logical principle, such as MP:  
 
A. One’s competence with MP shouldn’t bind one to infer Q once they believe both P and if 
P, then Q.  
 
B. An account of one’s competence with MP should make good sense of the fact that you 
can exercise or manifest your competence with MP without inferring according to MP. 
 
So here is a proposal, which meets these conditions: being competent with a logical 
principle is knowing a proposition – it is having propositional knowledge of that principle. 
In particular, being competent with MP is knowing a proposition. 
 
So, the general initial propositionalist proposal is this: 
 
                                                           
23
 Notice here that this sort of reasoning might in some sense mimic a proof of not-P in natural deduction from 
the assumption that if P, then Q. In that case, one would assume P, derive a contradiction (Q and not-Q) and 
then conclude not-P. 
  
14
(UP): Understanding a logical constant is knowing its introduction and 
elimination rules. 
 
The special case of ‘if, then’: 
 
(UP‘if, then’): Understanding ‘if, then’ knowing both CP and MP. 
 
I again leave CP behind: 
 
(UP‘if, then’-MP): Understanding ‘if, then’ requires knowing MP, i.e. it requires 
knowing that P and if P, then Q together entail Q. 
 
Given (UP‘if, then’-MP), a situation in which you believe both P and if P, then Q but do not 
infer Q, such as (Ice-Cream) is not one in which your response is inadequate. If you know 
the proposition that P and if P then Q together entail Q, that might of course give you a good 
reason to infer in a certain way, but that need not bind you to infer in that way. There is 
nothing binding about a bit of propositional knowledge – it will count as a consideration that 
might have some influence on your reasoning, but it is not going to bind you to infer Q, 
once you believe P and if P, then Q. This is to say that the fact that you do not infer 
according to MP in (Ice-Cream) is not going to be something that is inconsistent with your 
understanding of ‘if, then’.  
 
This means that conditions A and B are met. Although knowing MP might count towards 
inferring according to it, it seems that that knowledge would be manifested if you merely 
considered what knowledge of that proposition would commit you to do if you believed 
both P and if P then Q, without having to believe it. 
 
And this also means that (UP‘if, then’-MP) meets constraint (CT): there need not be any 
suggestion that any knowledge or competence or understanding has been destroyed in (Ice-
Cream): for the account is silent about what ought to happen once you believe P and if P, 
the Q. So there is no inconsistency there between your understanding of ‘if, then’ and you 
rejecting one of your initial views rather than inferring. 
 
(UP‘if, then’) says that understanding ‘if, then’ is having propositional knowledge of logical 
rules. Let me address some initial worries one might have about this.  
 
Firstly, what matters here, when the issue concern how competence coheres with 
performance, is the propositional aspect of the proposal. This is the aspect of the proposal 
that helps meeting (CT‘if, then’), not the fact that it is propositional knowledge that is talked 
about. So those who worry about whether understanding an expression could really involve 
propositional knowledge (e.g. because understanding does not seem to require justification, 
but propositional knowledge does) are so far free to drop talk of knowledge.
24
 The key to 
the proposal is that understanding ‘if, then’ is having a propositional attitude to CP and MP. 
The knowledge bit is not what is doing the work.  
 
Secondly, one might worry about the propositional aspect itself. The objection would be that 
raised in section 2, that a propositional account is conceptually too demanding. Having 
propositional knowledge of MP would require you to possess the relevant concepts (e.g. 
‘imply’) that figure in MP. So the objection here is that that might be conceptually too 
                                                           
24 See Pettit (2002) for discussion. 
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demanding – e.g. young children might not have these concepts. This objection will have 
any force only if the following assumptions are in place: first, that young children, for 
instance, reason according to MP or understand ‘if, then’; second, that it is necessary to 
have an exact grasp of the concepts used to state MP to count as having propositional 
knowledge of MP – for instance the concept of implication.  
 
Concerning the fact that a propositional account might be conceptually too demanding: it 
may well be that reasoning according to MP actually takes some hard learning and only 
arises at a relatively late stage. This is especially the case if we are talking here of reasoning 
according to MP in the sort of reliable or safe way needed to count as being competent with 
MP. If reasoning according to MP takes some learning, it is acceptable to say that young 
children and some other people may not count as knowing it. 
 
Concerning grasping the exact concepts used in stating MP: suppose we subscribe to the 
division of linguistic labour. On this picture people with partial or shallow grasp of (meta-
)logical concepts could still count as understanding ‘if, then’ on a propositional account 
(just like Putnam understands ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ but cannot tell elms and beeches apart). 
They would understand it deferentially. Maybe they would not be very good at explaining 
the rule, at telling a valid inference from one that’s not, and they would sometimes commit 
fallacies. But on that picture of understanding, which seems to be otherwise widely 
accepted, there would be no obstacle to saying that someone who does not exhibit a great 
deal of conceptual sophistication when it comes to logical concepts could count as 
understanding them. And if they understand them in this way, there would be no obstacle of 
principle to saying that they have propositional knowledge of logical principles.  
 
This is just to say that a propositionalist has the resources to address the charge that 
appealing to propositional knowledge here is too demanding conceptually.  
 
In closing I briefly discuss Boghossian’s view on the connection between having a 
disposition to reason according to MP and having a propositional attitude towards MP. As 
mentioned in section 2, Boghossian thinks that having a disposition to reason according to 
MP is required to have any belief about MP or its status. When he states the relevant belief 
he states it thus:  
 
‘… If p is true and that ‘if p, then q’ is true, then q has to be true.’
25
 
 
This might come as a surprise, and one might have expected that he would have something 
about rejection here too, given that this belief is grounded in the multi-track disposition 
(UDR‘if, then’-MP)*.  
 
However, one might also think that facts about rejections are somehow implicit in this 
statement of the propositional attitude involving MP. Now one worry which I raised with 
(UDR‘if, then’-MP)* was that, if (Parity) holds, it entails that one has to be competent with MT 
in order to count as understanding ‘if, then’. Thus one question that arises here is whether 
Boghossian’s statement of the belief about MP, or any kind of propositional account, would 
entail that understanding ‘if, then’ requires being competent with MT. If that turned out to 
be the case, then (UDR‘if, then’-MP)* and (UP‘if, then’-MT) would be equally bad in that they 
would require that one has to understand ‘not’ in order to understand ‘if, then’.  
 
                                                           
25 Boghossian (2000), p. 250. 
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The worry would arise if for instance knowing that a logical rule is truth-preserving required 
understanding negation. For instance one could argue that understanding that if P, and if P 
then Q are both true, then Q is true requires understanding that if Q is not true, either P or if 
P, then Q is not true. Perhaps knowing that the premises necessarily entail the conclusion is 
just the same as knowing that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion 
false.  
 
I cannot address this point in full here. But I think that it would certainly take some 
argument to show that believing or knowing that MP is truth-preserving requires 
understanding negation. For instance, it seems possible to know that the truth of both P and 
if P and Q entails that of Q while leaving it open what the falsity of Q would entail with 
respect to the truth-values of P and if P, then Q. It also seems possible that one might 
understand truth-preservation, but have non-orthodox views about falsity and its interaction 
with negation, so that there is not analytic connection for the between the former and the 
latter. Part of what is at issue here is the interaction between understanding ‘is true’ on the 
one hand, and understanding ‘is false’. It seems to me that it is not at all clear that 
understanding the truth of a sentence or the fact that a certain inference pattern preserves 
truth requires understanding the circumstances in which the sentence would be false (or not 
true) or the inference pattern would be not truth-preserving. If truth, falsity and negation can 
be understood relatively independently of each other, a propositional account of knowing 
(or being competent with) MP will not require knowing (being competent) with anything 
like MT. So in this sense too it will be superior to an account in terms of multi-track 
dispositions such as (UDR‘if, then’-MT). 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
A propositional account of understanding the logical constants can meet constraint (CT). 
Moreover it can do so while avoiding the charge that it is conceptually too demanding. By 
contrast dispositionalist accounts run into difficulties. An account of understanding ought to 
connect attributions of understanding of an expression with manifestations of understanding 
of that expression. The dispositionalist account fails in this despite at first sight promising to 
make a tight connection between competence and performance. However, as cases such as 
(Ice-Cream) reveal, although there ought to be an explanatory link between understanding 
and manifesting that understanding, it is not as tight as the dispositionalist requires: it is not 
the a link such that understanding prescribes specific ways to in which it ought to be 
manifested, as the dispostionalist suggests. It is better captured by the loose relation there 
typically is between knowing a proposition and what counts as manifesting that 
knowledge.
26
 
                                                           
26
 Thanks to the participants at Fifth International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication on 
‘Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge’, in Riga, for a very useful discussion on the material of this paper. 
Special thanks to Douglas Patterson for detailed comments on the penultimate draft of this paper, and to Jane 
Friedman, Thomas Kroedel and James Morauta for extremely useful discussions on its topic. 
  
17
References 
 
Besson, C. (2010), ‘Propositions, Dispositions and Logical Knowledge’ 
 (forthcoming), Logical Knowledge and Ordinary Reasoning’ 
Boghossian, P. (1996), ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’, Noûs 30: pp. 360-391. 
 (1997) ‘Analyticity’, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Bob Hale and 
Crispin Wright, (eds), Oxford: Blackwell: pp. 331-368. 
 (2000), ‘Knowledge of Logic’, in New Essays on the A Priori, Paul Boghossian and 
Christopher Peacocke (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp. 229-254. 
 (2001), ‘How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?’, Philosophical Studies, 106: 
pp. 1-40. 
 (2003), ‘Blind Reasoning’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 77, pp. 
225–248. 
 (2004), ‘Is Meaning Normative?’, Christian Nimtz and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), 
Philosophy-Science-Scientific Philosophy, Paderborn: Mentis: PP. 205-218.  
Bird, A. (2007), Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Carroll, L. (1895), ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’, Mind, 4: pp. 278-280. 
Chomsky, N. (1965), Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Devitt, M. (2006), Ignorance of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fodor, J. (2008), LOT 2, The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hale, Bob and Crispin Wright. (2000) ‘Implicit Definitions and the A Priori’, in New Essays 
on the A Priori, Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds), Oxford: OUP: pp. 
286-319. 
Harman, G. (1982), ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 
23(2): pp. 242-256. 
 (1986), Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Mac Farlane, J. (2009), ‘Logical Constants’, The Stanford Encyclopedia Online: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/ 
Peacocke, Christopher. (1995) A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
 (2005) ‘The A Priori’, in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Frank 
Jackson and Michael Smith (eds), Oxford: OUP: pp. 739-763. 
Pettit, D. (2002), ‘Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language’, Mind 111 
(443): pp. 519-550. 
Priest, G. (1979), ‘Two Dogmas of Quineanism’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 29: pp. 289-
301. 
Rumfitt, I. (2000), ‘“Yes” and “No”’’, Mind, 109: pp. 787-829. 
  (2001), ‘Semantic Theory and Necessary Truth’, Synthèse, 126: pp. 283-324. 
Ryle, G. (1946), ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, repr. in and ref. to (1971), Collected 
Papers, Vol. 2. London: Hutchinson & Co.: pp. 212-225. 
 (1949), The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson & Co. 
